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The Financial Impact of a Withdrawn ISO 9001 Certificate 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess to what extent the loss of the ISO 9001 
certification affects the decertified firms’ financial performance.  
Design/methodology/approach – Using standard event-study methods, this paper matches a 
sample of 143 Portuguese companies that lost their ISO 9001 certification with similar non-
event counterpart firms (according to return-on-assets and size) and compares the 
performance of these two groups of firms using financial data collected from the AMADEUS 
database. 
Findings – Results show no statistical significant differences in the financial performance (as 
measured by return-on-assets, return-on-sales, and sales growth) between companies that lost 
their ISO 9001 certification and their matched firms. Although the literature suggests that 
certification improves firms’ performance and that the benefits of certification may last over 
long periods of time, this paper’s results suggest that, after decertification, companies do not 
exhibit over or underperformance in their operations vis-à-vis comparable firms that do not 
undergo the same event. 
Originality/value – As far as the authors are aware, this is the first study assessing the impact 
of ISO 9001 certificate withdrawal on the decertified firms’ financial performance.  
 
Keywords: ISO 9000, ISO 9001, certificate withdrawal, loss of certificate, decertification, 
financial impact, event study. 
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1. Introduction  
ISO 9001 is a coherent set of standards developed in 1987 by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) with the purpose of facilitating international trade (Marquardt, 
1999). The principles of ISO 9001 were derived from Total Quality Management, a broader 
and more demanding quality philosophy than ISO 9001. The less demanding principles and 
standards of ISO 9001 allowed it to become an easier starting point (Gotzamani and Tsiotras, 
2001; Najmi and Kehoe, 2001) for companies that want to develop a standard 
(undifferentiated) quality system (Conti, 2004; Boiral, 2011). These characteristics of ISO 
9001 also contributed to make it the most popular quality management system in the world 
(Viadiu et al., 2006). Indeed, ISO 9001 standards can be used as guidelines by organizations 
of any size, in any industry, and in any country (Yung, 1997; Marquardt, 1999; Boiral, 2011). 
Organizations may choose to simply follow the standards, without any formal external 
supervision, or they may choose to have their quality system audited by an independent 
agency and, by doing so, they may become ISO registered companies (Boiral, 2011). Many 
organizations choose to have their quality systems registered, because ‘of the perception that 
an independent confirmation of conformity adds value’ (ISO, 2012). In fact, most of the 
studies evaluating the impact of ISO 9001 conclude that certification has a significant effect 
on performance (e.g., Chow-Chua et al., 2003; Tzelepis et al., 2006; Chatzoglou et al., 2015). 
Similarly, the majority of studies suggest that certification can be a source of competitive 
advantage, with only a limited number of studies concluding the opposite (e.g., Conti, 2004; 
Casadesús and Karapetrovic, 2005).  
Extant research on ISO 9001 has also addressed other themes, such as motivations for 
ISO certification, advantages and disadvantages of certification, net benefits, success factors, 
barriers to implementation, management practices, and, recently, maintenance of ISO 9001 
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certification (for a short summary of the previous research see, for instance, Wahid and 
Corner, 2009). 
The topic of ISO 9001 certification withdrawal, however, remains to be explored. This 
gap in the literature might be surprising given that it has already been considered as an 
interesting research topic (McGuire and Dilts, 2008), and because certification withdrawal is a 
phenomenon of increasing importance. In fact, in the period 2006–2011, the average annual 
growth rate in the number of decertified firms was 25%, and the average number of new 
decertified companies was 60 thousand per year (ISO, 2014). Hence, this paper starts filing in 
an important gap in the literature as it investigates the impact of ISO 9001 certificate 
withdrawal on firms’ financial performance. 
The current study uses a sample of all Portuguese companies that lost their ISO 9001 
certification in 2008. Portugal is an interesting European country to study because it has 
experienced a fast growth in the number of ISO 9001 certified companies in the late 1990’s 
and in the beginning of the 21th century. Yet, in recent years, the number of ISO 9001 
certified firms in Portugal has plummeted (ISO, 2014). Using standard event study 
methodology, this paper investigates whether Portuguese decertified companies exhibit 
abnormal financial performance (as measured by return-on-assets, return-on-sales and sales 
growth) when compared to similar non-event firms.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature on the financial 
impact of ISO 9001 and develops the research hypothesis. Section 3 summarizes the data used 
in this study and explains the research methodology. Sections 4 and 5 present the results and 
the relevant robustness tests. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Previous studies on ISO 9001 and the financial impact of certification 
The vast majority of studies on ISO 9001 are related to the impact of certiﬁcation. 
Karapetrovic et al. (2010), for instance, identified more than one hundred studies in 
operations and quality management journals addressing this issue. Other research topics on 
ISO 9001 include the motivations for ISO 9001 certification, the success factors for the 
implementation of ISO 9001, and the management practices adopted during the 
implementation of ISO 9001. Typically, these papers cover the period before and surrounding 
the certification process and ignore the post-event period. One of the exceptions is the study 
of Wahid and Corner (2009), which addresses the problem of ISO 9001 maintenance and 
quote only two studies on the same topic. Studies ‘do not generally address what happens 
after … organizations have obtained their certification’ (Wahid and Corner, 2009). As a 
result, this paper contributes to understand what happens in the post-certification period by 
investigating whether the ISO 9001 certificate withdrawal impacts on decertified firms’ 
financial performance. 
In order to uncover previous studies on certification withdrawal, a search was conducted 
in the EBSCO Host Research databases using several distinct keywords. Such search revealed 
the nonexistence of studies on this particular subject. Therefore, this paper reviews the 
literature on the financial impact of ISO 9001 and draws the research hypothesis from that 
literature. Table 1 presents a summary of these studies together with their main results and 
conclusions.  
______________Table 1 Here_____________ 
 
Some of the samples employed in the studies of Table 1 are rather small (e.g., Beirão 
and Cabral, 2002; Pantouvakis and Dimas, 2010) but most samples are of a reasonable size, 
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i.e., more than a hundred companies and, in some cases, more than a thousand companies. 
Several studies (e.g., Terziovski et al., 1997; Corbett et al., 2005; Naveh and Marcus, 2005, 
2007; McGuire and Dilts, 2008) have considered at least one control group of noncertified 
companies, allowing for a better assessment of the impact of the certification. In most cases, 
sample firms operate in different industries, including manufacturing and service industries. 
Only few exceptions focus exclusively on specific industries, such as the USA motor carrier 
industry (Naveh and Marcus, 2007), the European port authorities (Pantouvakis and Dimas, 
2010) or the automotive supplier industry (Benner and Veloso, 2008). In general, the studies 
are nationwide, but some samples are composed by firms from more than one country 
(Terziovski et al., 1997; Simmons and White, 1999; Rajan and Tamimi, 2003; Naveh and 
Marcus, 2004, 2005; Feng et al., 2008; Pantouvakis and Dimas, 2010). Countries where 
nationwide studies were conducted are: USA (11), Greece (6), Canada (4), Spain (4), 
Australia (3), New Zealand (2), Singapore (2), Brazil (1), Colombia (1), Denmark (1), 
Holland (1), Malaysia (1), Pakistan (1), and Portugal (1).  
The methodological approach used in most of these studies is based on the comparison 
between the performance of certified and noncertified companies. In many cases, the 
comparison is made between these two groups of firms (e.g., Terziovski et al., 1997; 
Simmons and White, 1999; Häversjö, 2000; Singels et al., 2001), whereas in several other 
studies, certified firms are matched with firms sharing similar characteristics in terms of 
assets, return on assets and/or other criteria (e.g., Lima et al., 2000; Corbett et al., 2005; 
Naveh and Marcus, 2007; McGuire and Dilts, 2008). Comparison between groups is typically 
done using descriptives (e.g., Häversjö, 2000; Casadesús et al., 2001), parametric and 
nonparametric tests (e.g., Simmons and White, 1999; Lima et al., 2000, Heras et al., 2002a, 
2002b), data envelopment analysis (Pantouvakis and Dimas, 2010), factor analysis (e.g., 
Singels, et al., 2001), regression analysis (e.g., Naveh and Marcus, 2005), and, in several 
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cases, event studies (e.g., Naveh and Marcus, 2005; Corbett et al., 2005, McGuire and Dilts, 
2008). Studies that do not compare certified and noncertified companies adopt other statistical 
methodologies, such as regression analysis (e.g., Naveh and Marcus, 2004; Psomas et al., 
2013), cluster analysis (e.g., Casadesús et al., 2001), discriminant analysis (e.g., Gómez et al., 
2013) and factor analysis (e.g., Psomas et al., 2013). Most papers use financial data (e.g., 
Naveh and Marcus, 2005) but some rely only on surveys based on Likert scales of the 
perception of the financial impact of ISO 9001 (e.g., Naveh and Marcus, 2004; Psomas et al., 
2013). 
The large majority of studies in Table 1 conclude that ISO 9001 certification has a 
positive and significant impact on firms’ financial performance (Simmons and White, 1999; 
Chow-Chua et al., 2003; Mokhtar et al., 2005; Naveh and Marcus, 2007; Nair and Prajogo, 
2009; Pantouvakis and Dimas, 2010; Gómez et al., 2013; Psomas et al., 2013; Fatima, 2014; 
Psomas and Kafetzopoulos, 2014; Chatzoglou et al., 2015) and on firms’ stock prices 
(Docking and Dowen, 1999; Beirão and Cabral, 2002; Nicolau and Sellers, 2002; Corbett et 
al., 2005; Sharma, 2005; McGuire and Dilts, 2008). Despite the fact that some of the 
longitudinal studies have found supporting evidence in favor of causality between ISO 9001 
certification and financial performance (e.g., Corbett et al., 2005; Benner and Veloso, 2008), 
other studies note that the positive correlation between these two variables does not mean 
causality between them (see Heras et al., 2002b; Dick et al., 2008). 
Some other studies have noted, additionally, that the success of an ISO 9001 
implementation cannot be ascertained by simply comparing certified with noncertified 
companies, because there are many internal and external factors influencing this issue. 
Success of implementation is, in this view, contingent on several variables, such as 
organizational culture, internalization of ISO practices, top management support, desire to go 
beyond the minimal requirements of the standard, and number of certified competitors in the 
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same industry, among other factors (Terziovski et al., 1997; Naveh and Marcus, 2004, 2005; 
Briscoe et al., 2005; Boiral and Roy, 2007; Benner and Veloso, 2008; Feng et al., 2008; Nair 
and Prajogo, 2009; Cândido and Santos, 2011, 2015; Prajogo, 2011). Nevertheless, these 
studies assume that ISO has a favorable impact on performance, with only the impact level 
depending on the internal and external contextual aspects of the organization.  
In summary, there is a vast number of studies addressing the impact of ISO 9001 on 
firms’ performance. However, the impact of a certificate withdrawal on firms’ financial 
performance remains unknown.  
2.2. Hypothesis definition 
A thorough analysis of the studies identified in the context of this research revealed three 
basic pillars that are crucial to define the research hypothesis explored in this paper. The first 
pillar is the idea that ISO 9001 may impact positively on firms’ financial performance. 
Although causality has not been proven, the quality management theory and most of the 
empirical studies support this view. For instance, Corbett et al. (2005) found that ‘ISO 9000 
certification was indeed followed by significant abnormal improvements in financial 
performance’ and that ‘in light of the magnitude of the effects, it seems likely that factors 
other than ISO 9000 certiﬁcation contributed, but given the design of the study, these findings 
do indicate that the preparations for the first ISO 9000 certiﬁcation also contributed to 
superior performance’. Terziovski et al. (1997) and Feng et al. (2008) – in two studies where 
no significant differences are found between certified and non certified companies – also 
conclude that ISO 9001 can contribute to organizational performance if it is well planed, well 
implemented and a climate of change is created in the organization.  
The second pillar is the finding that the impact of ISO 9001 on the financial 
performance lasts long or accrues over time. Some studies (e.g. Häversjö, 2000; Heras et al., 
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2002a; Corbett et al., 2005; and Benner and Veloso, 2008) suggest that the impact of ISO 
9001 certification on firms’ performance can endure for years after the award of the ISO 9001 
certificate. Heras et al. (2002a) hypothesize that ‘the implementation of any type of tool, 
system, or program related to quality tends to pay off in the long, rather than the short run’. 
Existing empirical studies corroborate this hypothesis. For example, Häversjö (2000) 
concluded that ‘ISO [companies] seem to achieve a positive effect from their quality 
management systems in the first two years after registration’. In addition, Corbett et al. (2005) 
concluded that the long-term effects of ISO 9001 certification are strong given that 
‘cumulative improvements… appear to be strong and lasting, as all the longer-term 
[statistical] tests … show significant abnormal improvement in ROA… The magnitude of the 
longer-term effects is considerable, in the order of 1-4 percentage points.’ Other studies 
corroborate the idea that the ISO certification financial benefits tend to endure (e.g., 
Tsekouras et al., 2002), although some researchers conclude that such effects dissipate 
quickly over time (e.g., Wayhan et al., 2002). 
The last pillar supporting the research hypothesis of this study is that certification is not 
a requirement as companies can adopt the standards and benefit from them without being 
registered. According to ISO (2012) ‘Certification is not a requirement of the standards 
themselves, which can be implemented without certification for the benefits that they help 
user organizations to achieve for themselves and for their customers’. This position adopted 
by the International Organization for Standardization has found support in the literature (e.g. 
Karapetrovic et al., 2010), which sustains an even ampler perspective. Whereas ISO (2012) 
suggests that the benefits of ISO 9001 are higher when the company seeks formal registration, 
Karapetrovic et al. (2010) admits that there can be no difference in the degree of benefits 
achieved by registered adopters of the standards and non registered adopters of the standards. 
Together, these findings provide theoretical support to conjecture that a decertified 
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company may continue to reap some of the benefits of its previous certification and avoid a 
significant impact on its financial performance following the decertification event. This is a 
reasonable assumption as the benefits of certification seem to last over long periods (or accrue 
over time) and that the benefits of the ISO 9001 standards do not depend entirely upon a 
formal registration. Thus, drawing on the abovementioned theoretical pillars, this paper 
hypothesizes that firms’ financial performance is not significantly affected after ceasing to be 
registered with an official certification entity. In accordance, this paper formulates the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H0: Firms that were ISO 9001 certified and lost their certificate exhibit no 
abnormal operating performance in the post-event period (as measured by return-on-assets, 
return-on-sales and sales growth) when compared with similar firms that do not undergo the 
same event. 
Hypothesis HA: Firms that were ISO 9001 certified and lost their certificate exhibit 
abnormal operating performance in the post-event period (as measured by return-on-assets, 
return-on-sales and sales growth) when compared with similar firms that do not undergo the 
same event. 
If H0 is not rejected, it may be concluded that the performance of companies that lost 
their ISO 9001 certification is not significantly different from the performance of similar non-
event firms. Rejection of H0 would suggest that certification withdrawal has a significant 
impact on decertified firms’ financial performance. If this is the case, it also would suggest a 
significant impact on firms’ competitive advantage as abnormal performance is the single 
most important result of a sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1991; Barney and Clark, 
2007). 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Data and summary statistics 
This paper tests the impact of an ISO 9001 certification withdrawal on firms’ financial 
performance using a sample of 143 Portuguese firms. As described in Table 2, the sample was 
collected from an initial list of 318 Portuguese firms that lost their ISO certification in 2008 
using data from the Institute of Portuguese Accreditation and Certification. From this initial 
list of firms, the final sample excludes 2 firms that cannot be found on the AMADEUS 
database and other 173 firms with insufficient accounting data to conduct this study. 
______________Table 2 Here_____________ 
 
The final sample encompasses 143 firms that compete in seven major sectors, defined 
here according to each firm’s two-digit SIC code. Most (66 or 46% of total) are 
manufacturing firms (SIC Code 20-39), with wholesale (SIC Code 50-51) and retail firms 
(SIC Code 52-59) accounting for 18% and 9% of the total firms, respectively. The 
construction (SIC Code 15-17) and services (SIC Code 70-89) sectors are also important in 
the sample, as they respectively represent 12% and 10% of the total firms. Finally, the 
remaining 4% of firms operate in the transportation (SIC Code 40-49) and mining (SIC Code 
10-14) sectors. 
Table 3 presents additional statistics for the sample firms in the years 2007 and 2009 
(i.e., in the year leading up to the loss of the ISO certification and the year that follows). For 
comparison reasons, parallel statistics for the population of Portuguese firms available on the 
AMADEUS database are also presented.1 To remove the influence of extreme outliers, all 
variables are winsorized at the first and the 99th percentiles.  
                                                 
1 Not all AMADEUS firms have data available to compute all the variables in Table 3. Yet, on average, 227,656 
firms are considered when computing the statistics for the AMADEUS population presented in Table 3.  
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Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the results for the 2007 fiscal-year. As can be seen, in 
the year leading up to the event year, sample firms are significantly larger (as measured by the 
book value of assets and the number of employees) than the population of Portuguese firms 
present in the AMADEUS database, according to both the t-test (p<0.01) and the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test (p<0.01). Results for the remaining variables are somewhat less clear. In 
fact, Panel A of Table 3 suggests that, on average, the sample firms are less liquid (as 
measured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities), more exposed to the risk of 
failure (as measured by the interest coverage ratio), generating more cash (according to the 
cash-flow proxy), more profitable (in terms of return on assets) and growing at a much slower 
pace (as measured by the growth in sales) than their population counterparts. Yet, median 
results suggest otherwise (in particular, most tests for median differences are not significant 
even at the 10% level), which highlights that some extreme observations persist even after 
winsorizing the data. 
______________Table 3 Here_____________ 
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents parallel evidence for the 2009 fiscal year-end. Results are 
very similar to those discussed for the year 2007 but with two important differences. In fact, 
Panel B suggests that, in the year following the decertification, the sample firms are more 
profitable than their population peers (mean difference in ROA is 3.6%, p<0.01; median 
difference in ROA is 1.3%, p<0.05), but are growing at a much slower pace (mean difference 
in sales growth is -28.3%, p<0.01; median difference in sales growth is -3.3%, p<0.05).  
In a nutshell, the sample firms of this study are considerably larger before and after 
losing their ISO certification vis-à-vis the population firms. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that, only in the year following the decertification, such firms are more profitable (as 
measured by ROA), and growing at a slower rate (as measured by sales) in comparison to the 
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population of Portuguese firms. 
3.2. Event study methodology 
This paper now turns to more powerful tests to explore whether the loss of certification 
affects the operating performance of the sample firms. To that purpose, it draws heavily on 
the seminal paper of Barber and Lyon (1996), which emphasizes that the main idea of an 
event study is to compare the actual accounting-based performance of firms experiencing 
some well-defined event (i.e., the loss of ISO 9001 certification) with the performance that 
could be reasonably expected if no such event occurred. This study defines 2008 as the event-
year (henceforth denoted as year t), since it corresponds to the year when the sample firms 
lose their certification. The paper then tracks the abnormal financial performance of the 
sample firms over a three-year period (i.e. from year t+1 through to year t+3).  
A crucial issue in any event study is the measurement of abnormal performance. The 
early literature employs earnings-based measures as proxies for the firms’ operating 
performance (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 1988 and 1990; Asquith, Healy and Palepu, 1989). Yet, 
Barber and Lyon (1996) favor using operating income to that purpose as earnings figures can 
be clouded by special items, tax considerations or the accounting for minority interests. As 
such, in line with Barber and Lyon (1996), return-on-assets (ROA) is employed as the main 
operating performance measure in this study, with ROA defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the average of beginning- and ending-period year book 
value of total assets.  
To ensure the robustness of the results, this paper uses two additional measures of 
operating performance: a) Return-on-sales (ROS), defined as the ratio of EBIT to total sales; 
and b) the rate of growth in sales, defined as (Sales t − Sales t−1)/ Sales t−1. ROS expresses 
the profit margin that is produced per unit of sales and has the advantage of being immune to 
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problems of ‘historic cost’ since it is constructed solely with figures from the income 
statement. The disadvantage of ROS is that it does not directly measure the productivity of 
assets. As for the rate of growth in sales, this important measure helps us to understand 
whether the loss of certification impacts on a firm’s market share, as suggested by Corbett et 
al. (2005).  
One of the most challenging aspects when testing the long-run impacts of an event on 
firms’ operating performance is specifying a firm’s predicted performance in the absence of 
the event. The previous literature has dealt with this issue by using a control group of firms 
that exhibits similar levels of risk but does not experience the event. Barber and Lyon (1996) 
examine various models of the expected operating performance, and conclude that the only 
model that yields well-specified test statistics in all situations they consider is a change model 
that matches sample firms on both size and pre-event performance. In particular, the expected 
performance of sample firm i in any period t+l using period t as the base period is given by: 
   , , , ,i t l i t i t l i tE P P PI PI     (1) 
where, ,i tP is the actual performance of firm i in time t and ,i tPI is the performance of the 
control group in year t.  
Control firms are matched on size and pre-event performance as follows. For each 
sample firm i, this study identifies all firms in the AMADEUS database that have a book 
value of assets in year t-2 that lies between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm’s book 
value of assets in the same year.2 All firms that do not have a ROA that lies in the 90% to 
110% interval of the ROA of sample firm i are then excluded from the pool of potential match 
candidates. Finally, match candidates that do not have enough data to conduct the current 
                                                 
2 One sample firm does not have a valid match candidate when employing this size requirement. The alternative 
50% to 200% interval size rule is used in this case.  
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study over the three post-event years are deleted as Barber and Lyon (1996, p. 377) 
recommend holding the matching firm portfolio constant over time.3 Following Barber and 
Lyon (1996, p. 369), medians are used as proxy for the performance of the control group in 
year t.  
The abnormal performance of sample firm i in any period t+l using period t as the base 
period is estimated as follows: 
 , , ,i t l i t l i t lAP P E P     (2) 
where ,i t lP  is the actual performance of firm i in time t+l, and  ,i t lE P  is given by equation 
(1). 
The event study then consists of testing whether the abnormal performance is 
significantly different from zero. There are several possibilities for implementing this test, 
with Barber and Lyon (1996) showing that the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 
always more powerful than its t-test parametric counterpart in all the situations they consider. 
Thus, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is the main metric employed in this study for detecting 
the abnormal operating performance of the sample firms. For completeness, parallel results 
using t-tests are also reported.4   
4. Results  
Table 4 summarizes the results of the main test. In Panel A, ROA is employed as the 
performance measure and its dynamics is tracked over a number of periods. To give an 
example, when ‘Initial Year’ is 2007 and ‘Final Year’ is 2008 (i.e. the first row of Panel A of 
Table 4), the abnormal performance is computed for the sample firms in 2008 when the base 
                                                 
3 The matching procedure yields individual control portfolios that have between 1 and 583 matched firms.  
4 The Shapiro-Wilk test always rejected the hypothesis that abnormal performance is normally distributed with 
p-values below 0.01 in all the scenarios this paper explores. 
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year is 2007. As can be seen, the mean (median) abnormal performance value computed for 
such period is 0.5% (0.8%). These results suggest that the actual performance of the sample 
firms (as measured by ROA) is marginally higher than that one should expect in the period 
under scrutiny. Yet, the reported abnormal performance is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels as the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (i.e., this paper’s main 
statistical test) and the t-test for this period is always higher than 10%. As such, the statistical 
evidence suggests that in the period that immediately precedes the loss of ISO certification, 
the sample firms do not exhibit an especially high or low performance as compared to their 
expected performance. Expanding the analysis to the remaining entries of Panel A of Table 4 
is important since it sheds light on what happens once the sample firms lose their certification. 
As can be seen, none of the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (or the parametric t-tests) are 
significant at the 10% level in the post-event periods.  
______________Table 4 Here_____________ 
 
Panel B of Table 4 summarizes the results when using the ROS measure. None of the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (or the parametric t-tests) are again significant at conventional 
levels. Hence, the conclusion using ROS as measure of performance is very similar to that of 
ROA. Panel C of Table 4 presents the results for growth in sales. In general, the same 
conclusions as above apply. The main difference is that one of the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
is now marginally significant (when ‘Initial Year’ is 2008 and ‘Final Year’ is 2009). Despite 
such variation in results, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the sample firms do not 
experience abnormally high or low growth in sales both in the year leading up to the loss of 
the certification or in the post-event periods.  
Together, these results suggest that the main hypothesis of this paper cannot be rejected, 
i.e., that, post-event, Portuguese firms that lose their ISO 9001 certification in 2008 do not 
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experience a significant abnormal performance (as measured by ROA, ROS or rate of growth 
in sales) when compared to companies sharing similar size and pre-event performance. Such 
conclusion holds for the short- and more longer-term event periods that are considered, and 
does not depend on the base year that is employed to conduct the study. 5 
5. Robustness tests 
The main results presented on Section 4 are computed using the methodological choices that 
Barber and Lyon (1996) show yield well-specified test statistics in all situations they consider. 
Yet, it is important to verify to what extent the previous findings are robust to methodological 
changes related to the selection of the control firms.  
In the first robustness test, control firms are matched on industry and pre-event ROA. 
This is because Barber and Lyon (1996, p.383) show that change models of expected 
operating performance that control for industry (2-digit SIC code) and pre-event performance 
(as measured by ROA) yield well-specified tests in samples of larger firms. This alternative 
matching process is important in this paper as this study’s sample firms are significantly 
larger than their match counterparts (see Table 3).6 The actual test proceeds as follows. First, 
an initial pool of match candidates is identified for each sample firm i, all of which must have 
the same 2-digit SIC code of the sample firm two years before the event year. All firms that 
do not have ROA that lies in the 90% to 110% interval of the ROA of sample firm i are then 
delete. Match candidates are again required to have full accounting data on AMADEUS; thus, 
in the last step, control firms that do not comply with such data requirement are eliminated. 
                                                 
5 In nontabulated results, this paper also considers an alternative five years post-event period. Doing so reduces 
the workable sample to 67 firms (i.e., a loss of 53%), which negatively affects the power of the statistical tests. 
Yet, even in this setting, this paper’s main conclusion still holds. In particular, out of the 198 t- and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests, only 22 are significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. These results are available from the second 
author.  
6 Considering models of abnormal performance that match control firms on lagged ROA and 2-digit SIC code, 
lagged ROA and 4-digit SIC code or lagged ROA and 2-digit SIC code and size yields essentially the same 
result. These are available on request from the second author.  
 17 
 
Following Barber and Lyon (1996, p. 369), medians are used to proxy for the performance of 
the control group in year t.  
Table 5 summarizes the results of this first robustness test. As can be seen, ROA, ROS 
and growth in sales are again employed as performance measures, and the same event-periods 
as in Section 4 are used. Moving on to the actual results, the main finding is that the evidence 
in Table 5 is very similar to the results previously discussed. In particular, none of the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests or t-test employed to study the statistical significance of the 
abnormal performance of the sample firms is significant at conventional levels. As such, this 
paper concludes that using a different way to define the control firms does not alter the nature 
of its main results. In fact, the sample firms do not seem to exhibit any abnormal performance 
relative to their industry and pre-event performance peers. Such conclusion holds for both the 
event-period leading up to the loss of the ISO certification, and to all post-event periods 
explored in this study. 
______________Table 5 Here_____________ 
 
An alternative robustness test that draws on the work of Corbett et al. (2005) is now 
presented. This is an important paper as it investigates the abnormal performance of firms 
following their ISO 9001 certification, i.e., the exact opposite event that the current paper 
considers. Importantly, Corbett et al. (2005) do not use a portfolio of matched firms as Barber 
and Lyon (1996) do, but rely on one-to-one matching to compute their main results. Given the 
similarities, this paper also uses the alternative matching procedure presented by Corbett et al. 
(2005) to assess the robustness of its initial findings.  
In this test, equation (1) is still used to specify the expected performance of the sample 
firms but now a single control firm is employed to determine the control group’s 
performance. In particular, for each sample firm i, the control group is now the firm in the 
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same industry (2-Digit SIC Code) that is ‘closest’ to the event firm in terms of book value of 
assets and ROA. Following Corbett et al. (2005), the book value of assets and ROA are 
transformed into z-scores by subtracting the industry mean and dividing by the industry 
standard deviation. This is done using data available on AMADEUS two years before the 
event year. ‘Closest’ firm is then defined as the firm with the smallest Euclidean distance in 
the two-dimensional space of z-scores to the sample firm. Moreover, in line with Corbett et al. 
(2005), the ROA of the control firm must lie between 90% and 110% of its sample firms’ 
ROA and its book value of assets must lie between 50% and 200% of the sample firm’s 
assets.7 In addition, match candidates are required to have all the necessary data on 
AMADEUS; if not, they are deleted from the pool of potential match candidate.  
______________Table 6 Here_____________ 
 
Table 6 summarizes the results of this robustness test. In line with the previous tests, 
ROA, ROS and growth in sales are employed as performance measures and the same event-
periods as above are considered. Table 6 shows that none of the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
are significant even at the 10% level. This constitutes additional evidence to support that the 
main research hypothesis of this study cannot be rejected. Parallel parametric results are, 
however, somewhat different. In particular, some of the t-test are now significant at the 5% or 
10% level for ROA, ROS and growth in sales. Yet, such results should be interpreted with 
caution since, as previously mentioned (see footnote 4), the Shapiro-Wilk tests always reject 
the hypothesis that abnormal performance is normally distributed. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Previous studies suggest that, in general, there is a positive and significant impact of ISO 
                                                 
7 A valid match candidate cannot be found for three sample firms using this size requirement. For these 
particular firms, the size interval is expanded until at least one valid match candidate is found. 
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9001 certification on the financial performance of firms, and that such benefits are likely to 
persist or accrue for several years (Corbett et al., 2005; Heras et al., 2002a). However, despite 
ISO 9001 having become the most popular quality management system in the world, the 
number of decertified firms has increased considerably in recent years. Yet, to the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, no study has addressed the consequences of an ISO 9001 certificate 
withdrawal. This paper starts shedding light on this issue by exploring the abnormal financial 
performance of 143 Portuguese firms that lost their ISO 9001 certification in 2008. Results 
show that decertified firms do not perform differently from their matched counterparts in the 
post-event period. Therefore, this paper reveals that, contrary to certification, ISO 9001 
decertification does not lead to any significant financial abnormal performance. 
This paper’s findings contribute to the ISO 9001 literature, and have important 
implications for practice. On the one hand, the absence of abnormal performance following an 
ISO 9001 certificate withdrawal suggests that companies that spend their resources in order to 
get certified may end up making changes that are internalized, with such changes continuing 
to benefit the firm even when the certification is lost. On the other hand, failure to find 
evidence of abnormal performance in the post-decertification period suggests that companies 
may stop spending resources to make ISO related changes, which questions the idea that the 
benefits of ISO 9001 certification are likely to accrue for several years. Together, the results 
of this paper indicate that the potential benefits of a certification process persist following a 
certification withdrawal as firms may have internalized such benefits, but do not support the 
view that certification benefits accrue in the post-decertification period. 
The results of this paper also contribute to discuss the competitive advantage of ISO 
9001 certification since they suggest that decertification has no impact on firms’ previous 
level of competitive advantage. The resource based theory offers an interesting explanation to 
such result as it postulates that competitive advantage can only be achieved through 
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possession and use of resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and conveniently managed 
(Barney and Clark, 2007). If ISO 9001 registration is perceived as a resource, it can be argued 
that such registration is a valuable, rare and a somewhat difficult resource to imitate. 
Therefore, this quality management system is likely to contribute decisively to cost reduction, 
performance improvement, and differentiation (e.g., Feo and Barnard, 2004) in the post-
certification period. In this view, the ISO 9001 certification may constitute a source of 
competitive advantage that, when properly internalized during the certification process, is 
expected to persist as a competitive advantage following a certificate withdrawal, although it 
does not accrue in the post-decertification period.  
A comprehensive understanding on the links between ISO 9001, internalization, and 
competitive advantage, however, can only be achieved if one explores the reasons leading up 
to the certification and decertification of the firms. As Briscoe et al. (2005) suggest, there are 
many reasons why firms want to be ISO registered. For instance, some firms want to be 
registered because they perceive a quality benefit. Yet, others may want to achieve a preferred 
supplier status, or simply want to fulfill their costumer expectations. Complying with 
regulations and requirements is another reason to seek ISO certification. Decertification may 
also be due to different reasons. For instance, companies may decide not to renew their 
certification because they believe that they have already internalized its benefits. Similarly, 
voluntary decertification may occur if the firm considers that certification is expensive or 
simply perceives that its benefits are lower than its costs. Another example of voluntary 
decertification occurs when firms anticipate that their certificate will not be renewed. 
Decertification may also be involuntary when the certification body considers that the 
company no longer fulfills with the standards to be certified. The reasons for the ISO 9001 
certification/decertification should, in principle, affect the firm’s financial performance in the 
years following certification withdrawal. Unfortunately, this paper cannot explore this issue 
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as the Institute of Portuguese Accreditation and Certification does not keep a record of such 
data. Further research, however, may explore this topic and help to understand the impact of 
certification/decertification motivations on the financial impact of certification withdrawal. 
The conclusions and implications of this paper must be read with caution as they are 
drawn from a small sample of Portuguese firms that lost their ISO 9001 certification in 2008. 
This is a particular setting to explore this paper’s main research question since Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece and, to some extent, Spain and Italy, faced severe economic distress at that 
time. The excessive external and fiscal deficits in Portugal led to an intervention by the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the European Central Bank in the 
spring of 2011. Although this paper’s methodology explicitly accounts for this issue, as both 
sample and control firms experienced identical environmental conditions, further research 
could help understand to what extent this paper’s findings hold in different macroeconomic 
settings. This paper’s results are, however, clearly relevant to all firms operating in small 
open economies experiencing harsh macroeconomic conditions. In fact, Portugal is a full 
member of the European Union, the European Economic and Monetary Union, and the 
Schengen Area. Therefore, Portuguese firms must deal on a daily basis with their European 
competitors, without the Portuguese Government being able to implement any limitations on 
the free movement of goods, money, and people. Moreover, managers of firms operating out 
of countries with better macroeconomic conditions can also benefit from this paper’s results. 
In fact, globalization has intensified competition worldwide and, as a result, such managers 
are bound to compete at some stage with firms based at countries experiencing levels of 
economic hardship similar to those faced by Portugal in 2008. 
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Table 1. Research on the financial impact of ISO 9000 
Study Results/conclusion 
Terziovski et al. (1997) ISO 9000 is not significantly related to performance. 
Docking and Dowen (1999) Increase in stock value and stockholders wealth, but only in the case of the 
smaller firms.  
Simmons and White (1999) ISO companies are more profitable (ROA). 
Häversjö (2000) Two years after registration the difference in rates of return between certified 
and non-certified firms is higher than it was before registration.  
Lima et al. (2000) No difference found in performance. 
Casadesús et al. (2001) 64% of the certified companies reported a considerable increase in ROI. 
Singels et al. (2001) Non-certified companies involved with other quality initiatives exhibited higher 
performances. 
Beirão and Cabral (2002) Financial performance improved after certification. 
Heras et al. (2002a; 2002b) Profitable firms are more likely to seek ISO 9000 certiﬁcation, but ISO 
certified firms do not become more profitable. 
Nicolau and Sellers (2002) The market reacts positively to the award of ISO 9000 certificates. 
Tsekouras et al. (2002) No significant effect of ISO 9000 registration. 
Wayhan et al. (2002) Limited impact on financial performance and the impact ‘dissipated quickly 
over time’.  
Chow-Chua et al (2003) Certified firms perform significantly better than uncertified firms. 
Martínez-Costa and 
Martínez-Lorente (2003) 
Positive abnormal returns but most were not significant. 
Rajan and Tamimi (2003) The ISO 9000 portfolio outperformed the S&P 500 index. 
Naveh and Marcus (2004) ISO 9000 has a financial impact on business performance. 
Naveh and Marcus (2005) The hierarchical regression corroborated the conclusion from Naveh and 
Marcus (2004). The event study did not. 
Corbett et al. (2005) Significant abnormal improvement in financial performance. 
Lagodimos et al. (2005) Significant differences in ROA between certified and non certified companies 
found only in the commerce industry.  
Sharma (2005) Financial performance of certified firms was significantly greater than that of 
non-certified firms. 
Mokhtar et al. (2005) ISO 9000 companies performed better than non-ISO 9000 companies.  
Terlaak and King (2006) There was no significant effect of ISO 9000 on operational performance.  
Naveh and Marcus (2007) Significant improvement in financial performance after certification.  
Benner and Veloso (2008) ISO 9000 has a positive and significant effect on ROA and on Tobin’s q, but 
not on ROS. 
Feng et al. (2008) Significant relationship between certification and business performance (at 
10% significance level). 
McGuire and Dilts (2008) The market reaction to ISO 9001:2000 is statistically significant and higher 
than the reaction to ISO 9001:1994 and to ISO 9002:1994.  
Nair and Prajogo (2009) Internalization of ISO 9000 standards was positively associated with business 
performance. 
Pantouvakis and Dimas 
(2010) 
‘ISO certified ports are more efficient financially than their noncertified 
competitors’. 
Gómez et al. (2013) ISO 9000 certification has a positive effect on productivity and profitability. 
Psomas et al. (2013) ISO 9001:2008 has a significant impact on performance. 
Fatima (2014) There is an association between ISO 9000 certification and financial 
performance in large and medium companies, but not in small firms. 
Psomas and Kafetzopoulos 
(2014) 
‘ISO 9001 certified companies significantly outperform the non-certified with 
regard to ... financial performance’. 
Chatzoglou et al. (2015) ISO 9000 is highly associated with improvements in overall financial 
performance. 
Ismyrlis and Moschidis 
(2015) 
The least important benefits were business results such as profits, costs and 
market share. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Defining the sample 
 Frequency 
Cases identified in IPAC’s database 318 
Cases not found on AMADEUS 2 
Cases with insufficient data on AMADEUS  173 
Final sample  143 
 
  
Table 3: Summary statistics: pre-event year  
 
Sample Firms Amadeus Population Diff. (Sample-Amadeus) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Accounting data for the 2007 fiscal year 
TA (€m) 8.4 2.8 0.8 0.2 7.7*** 2.6*** 
EMP 58.5 32.0 7.8 3.0 50.8*** 29.0*** 
LEV 23.3% 20.9% 23.4% 6.9% -0.1% 13.9%*** 
LIQ 1.7 1.4 5.2 1.2 -3.6*** 0.2 
INCOV 5.5 1.6 20.4 1.6 -15.0*** 0.0 
CS 6.9% 5.6% 0.0% 5.4% 6.8%*** 0.1% 
ROA 4.6% 4.2% 2.1% 3.3% 2.5%*** 0.9% 
SG 9.6% 7.7% 38.6% 5.2% -29.0%*** 2.5% 
Panel B: Accounting data for the 2009 fiscal year 
TA (€m) 8.7 2.8 0.8 0.2 7.8*** 2.6*** 
EMP 54.2 27.0 7.7 3.0 46.5*** 24.0*** 
LEV 26.1% 26.3% 25.1% 9.3% 1.0% 17.0%*** 
LIQ 2.0 1.4 6.2 1.3 -4.2*** 0.1 
INCOV 11.8 1.5 12.3 1.4 -0.6 0.1 
CS 5.3% 6.0% -0.4% 5.3% 5.7%*** 0.7% 
ROA 3.7% 3.5% 0.1% 2.3% 3.6%*** 1.3%** 
SG -3.7% -6.6% 24.6% -3.3% -28.3%*** -3.3%** 
 
Notes: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% level. TA: total assets in €m. EMP: number 
of employees.  LEV: leverage proxy (total debt/total assets). LIQ: liquidity proxy (current assets/current liabilities). 
INCOV: bankruptcy risk proxy (interest expense/EBIT). CS: cash-flow proxy (cash-flow/ average of beginning- and 
ending-period book value of total assets). ROA: return on assets (EBIT/average of beginning- and ending-period 
book value of total assets). SG: growth proxy ((sales in current year/sales previous year) – 1).  
Table 4: Abnormal Performance, matching by SIZE and ROA 
Initial Year Final Year AP Mean AP Median 
p-value 
(t-test) 
p-value 
(WSR test) 
Panel A: operating performance is measure by ROA 
2007 2008 0.5% 0.8% 0.48 0.18 
2007 2009 0.6% 0.4% 0.49 0.22 
2007 2010 1.2% 0.6% 0.25 0.23 
2007 2011 0.3% 1.1% 0.78 0.23 
2008 2009 0.1% 0.2% 0.91 0.78 
2008 2010 0.7% 0.3% 0.47 0.38 
2008 2011 -0.2% 0.4% 0.80 0.73 
Panel B: operating performance is measure by ROS 
2007 2008 2.3% 0.6% 0.45 0.40 
2007 2009 2.0% 0.4% 0.49 0.79 
2007 2010 6.4% 0.6% 0.37 0.44 
2007 2011 7.9% 1.0% 0.24 0.41 
2008 2009 -0.3% -0.1% 0.79 0.61 
2008 2010 4.2% 0.3% 0.33 0.80 
2008 2011 5.6% 0.9% 0.32 0.81 
Panel C: operating performance is measure by growth in sales 
2007 2008 2.0% 0.5% 0.46 0.44 
2007 2009 0.1% -0.9% 0.99 0.47 
2007 2010 1.1% -0.1% 0.72 0.64 
2007 2011 3.2% 0.7% 0.36 0.65 
2008 2009 -1.9% -2.7% 0.57 0.06* 
2008 2010 -1.0% -1.1% 0.74 0.85 
2008 2011 0.9% 0.7% 0.78 0.96 
Notes: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% level 
Table 5: Abnormal Performance, matching by Industry and ROA 
Initial Year Final Year AP Mean AP Median 
p-value 
(t-test) 
p-value 
(WSR test) 
Panel A: operating performance is measure by ROA 
2007 2008 0.5% 0.8% 0.45 0.14 
2007 2009 0.8% 0.8% 0.31 0.17 
2007 2010 1.5% 0.8% 0.13 0.12 
2007 2011 0.9% 1.5% 0.36 0.17 
2008 2009 0.3% 0.8% 0.69 0.48 
2008 2010 1.0% 0.6% 0.30 0.20 
2008 2011 0.3% 0.9% 0.73 0.37 
Panel B: operating performance is measure by ROS 
2007 2008 2.2% 0.5% 0.46 0.47 
2007 2009 2.3% 0.2% 0.43 0.73 
2007 2010 6.6% 0.6% 0.35 0.25 
2007 2011 8.2% 1.3% 0.22 0.18 
2008 2009 0.1% 0.2% 0.92 0.80 
2008 2010 4.4% 0.7% 0.31 0.63 
2008 2011 5.9% 1.1% 0.29 0.50 
Panel C: operating performance is measure by growth in sales 
2007 2008 1.6% 0.0% 0.54 0.61 
2007 2009 1.1% -2.4% 0.76 0.54 
2007 2010 1.0% 2.1% 0.72 0.76 
2007 2011 3.9% 3.5% 0.26 0.54 
2008 2009 -0.4% -2.1% 0.91 0.15 
2008 2010 -0.6% -0.2% 0.83 0.75 
2008 2011 2.1% 0.5% 0.52 0.65 
Notes: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% level 
  
Table 6: Abnormal Performance, one-to-one matching by Industry, assets and ROA 
Initial Year Final Year AP Mean AP Median 
p-value 
(t-test) 
p-value  
(WSR test) 
Panel A: operating performance is measure by ROA 
2007 2008 -0.3% -0.5% 0.71 0.49 
2007 2009 0.2% 0.6% 0.84 0.42 
2007 2010 3.0% 0.1% 0.09* 0.15 
2007 2011 1.4% 0.6% 0.31 0.16 
2008 2009 0.5% -0.1% 0.61 0.63 
2008 2010 3.3% 1.6% 0.05* 0.14 
2008 2011 1.7% 0.9% 0.19 0.29 
Panel B: operating performance is measure by ROS 
2007 2008 1.4% -0.3% 0.66 0.28 
2007 2009 2.1% 0.1% 0.49 0.84 
2007 2010 11.2% 0.2% 0.13 0.20 
2007 2011 37.4% 1.4% 0.01** 0.15 
2008 2009 0.7% 0.0% 0.62 0.94 
2008 2010 9.8% 1.0% 0.04** 0.19 
2008 2011 36.0% 0.6% 0.02** 0.11 
Panel C: operating performance is measure by growth in sales 
2007 2008 -13.3% 4.9% 0.34 0.33 
2007 2009 14.6% -1.3% 0.02** 0.26 
2007 2010 3.2% 2.6% 0.59 0.62 
2007 2011 8.2% 0.1% 0.15 0.70 
2008 2009 23.8% -1.0% 0.08* 0.73 
2008 2010 13.1% 2.1% 0.24 0.85 
2008 2011 19.8% 2.8% 0.12 0.83 
Notes:  *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% level 
